The European Union's Transatlantic Relationship. College of Europe EU Diplomacy Paper 2/2006, December 2006 by Burghardt, Günther.
www.coleurope.eu
Department of EU International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies
EU Diplomacy  
Papers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 / 2006
The European Union’s  
Transatlantic Relationship
Günter Burghardt 
 
Department of EU International Relations 
and Diplomacy Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
E EU U   D Di ip pl lo om ma ac cy y   P Pa ap pe er rs s   
2 2/ /2 20 00 06 6   
 
 
 
 
The European Union's Transatlantic 
Relationship 
 
 
Günter Burghardt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Günter Burghardt 2006  
 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail ird.info@coleurop.be | www.coleurope.eu/ird  Günter Burghardt 
  2
About the Author 
 
Dr. Günter Burghardt served as the European Union’s Ambassador in Washington, 
DC, from 1999 to 2004. Earlier, he had held positions at the European Commission as 
Political Director and Director General for External Relations as well as Deputy Chief 
of Staff of Commission President Jacques Delors. Dr. Burghardt teaches as a guest 
professor at the College of Europe in Bruges and at the European Institute of the Law 
Faculty of Ghent University. He joined the transatlantic law firm of Mayer, Brown, 
Rowe & Maw LLP as a Senior Counsel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editorial Team: 
Nike Bönnen, Mathieu Briens, Sieglinde Gstöhl, Dieter Mahncke, Kevin O'Connell 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail ird.info@coleurop.be | www.coleurope.eu/ird  
Views expressed in the EU Diplomacy Papers are those of the authors only and do 
not necessarily reflect positions of either the series editors or the College of Europe. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2006 
  3
Abstract 
 
Since its inception post-World War II, the European unification process has been 
embedded within a strong transatlantic dimension [Marshall-Plan, Truman/ 
EisenhowerMonnet, Kennedy/Hallstein]. Today, the EU-US relationship is still the most 
powerful, the most comprehensive and the strategically most important relationship 
in the world: most powerful because the EU and the US combine some 60% of the 
world's GDP, with the EU having overtaken the US numbers of around US $10 trillion 
recently. They represent around 40% of world trade in goods and even more in 
services. They hold 80% of the global capital markets. They are each other's main 
trading partner and source, as much as recipient, of foreign direct investment. Most 
comprehensive because there is scarcely an issue that does not involve the 
transatlantic relationship – from Afghanistan to biotech, from WTO negotiations to 
counter-terrorism, from data privacy to aircraft – the EU and US are involved 
bilaterally, regionally or globally. Strategically most important because Europe 
matters to America, and America matters to Europe, because of major converging 
concerns, largely compatible values and over-lapping interests. The EU and the US 
share common objectives with regard to coherent strategies for the promotion of 
peace, stability and economic development around the globe. There is – in the short 
and medium term – no alternative to the EU-US relationship. Günter Burghardt 
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The Three post-World War II Phases of the Transatlantic Relationship 
 
'Europeanism' and 'Atlanticism' do not stand in opposition to each other. European 
integration and transatlantic cooperation constitute a synergetic unity. A capable 
unified Europe strengthens the transatlantic relationship and can support the US. A 
weak, divided Europe, however, weakens the transatlantic partnership and with it 
the US. A balanced transatlantic partnership does not require 'less' America but 
'more' Europe. It needs a less 'imperialistic' America and a more efficient, more 
'relevant' Europe. On the one hand, the EU has to reinforce its institutional and 
operational capacities to strengthen its role as an efficient international actor. On 
the other, the US has to unambiguously reach out to the EU as a collectively 
respected partner. The EU and the US would both benefit from a dialogue on their 
respective security strategies, including a common threat analysis, and a genuine 
effort to close the gap between the US doctrines of preemption and preeminence 
and the EU doctrine of effective multilateralism. The overriding objective should be a 
fully complementary and internationally legitimized conceptual and strategic 
approach in the fight against terrorism. Meaningful EU-US consultations should 
precede and, wherever possible, be followed by joint action based on the 
complementarity of US and European 'tool boxes' combining hard and soft power. 
There would be no America without Europe and there would be no free, prosperous 
and united Europe without America. Together, Europe and America can achieve 
almost anything; divided, they risk failing in many things: "When we quarrel we make 
headlines, when we work together, we make progress!"1. A solid, well functioning 
transatlantic relationship remains indispensable to tackle current economic and 
security challenges. Both sides should effectively take the next decade of 
transatlantic partnership forward, politically by updating the New Transatlantic 
Agenda, and economically by working towards a barrier-free transatlantic 
economic area. The next transatlantic change-overs in 2009, when the inauguration 
of a new US President will coincide with a renewal of key EU institutions, could 
provide an opportunity for such a truly comprehensive review of the 'state of the 
(transatlantic) union'. 
 
                                                 
1    Former Secretary of State Colin Powell during the EU-US Ministerial meeting at the 
Department of State on 18 December 2002. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2006 
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Transatlantic relations are based on two pillars: NATO and the bilateral relations 
between the European Union and the countries of North America – the US, Canada, 
and, with regard to NAFTA, Mexico – with the EU-US partnership occupying a pivotal 
role. Any review of the European Union's external relations would be incomplete 
without discussing the vital partnership between the EU and the United States of 
America, the oldest and strategically most important chapter of the EU's gradually 
and painstakingly evolving external policies. This is of course based on the close 
historical and cultural roots and affinities between the 'old' and the 'new' world: not 
only is 'America a child of Europe' (Hallstein), and are 'America and Europe family' 
(Einstein), but the US also stood at the cradle of the very beginnings of Europe's post 
World War II (WW II) unification process.  
 
The EU-US partnership is the backbone of any EU foreign policy strategy although the 
transatlantic relationship over the past 50 years went through ups and downs hitting 
occasional bumps in the road. The recent most profound crisis over America's 
unilateral decision to wage all out 'war on terror', based on President Bush's polarizing 
neoconservative doctrine of 'prevention, preemption and preeminence', the 
extensive reliance on US military power, his 'axis of evil' rhetoric leading to the 
invasion of Iraq and the overly simplistic approach to the complexity of Middle East 
policies, has put an unprecedented strain on the relationship. However, the 
partnership between Europe and the United States must endure, not because of the 
immense achievements in the past, but because the common future depends on it. 
Thus the recent divide did not arise because of poor atmospherics or 
miscommunication. It arose because of one side taking action strongly opposed by 
the other, or declining to join in actions that the other strongly favors. Unilateral 
American policies sparked divisions among Europeans. European distrust, in turn, 
convinced American neoconservatives of the need to impose their agenda and to 
divide Allies into 'those who are with us and those who are against us', through 
'coalitions of the willing', not of the convinced. 
 
In hindsight transatlantic relations can be divided into three broad phases: (1) from 
the early beginnings in the late 1940s to the end of the Cold War in 1989; (2) from 
'Eleven/Nine', 1989, to 'Nine/Eleven', 2001; and (3) from post-September-Eleven to 
today's era of New Realism. During the entire period, a transatlantic agenda 
emerged, reflecting both Europe's ever stronger capabilities as well as its apparent Günter Burghardt 
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deficiencies. Dozens of sector or issue specific agreements were reached 
representing an impressive transatlantic acquis. While so far an overarching EU-US 
Partnership Treaty2 has not been a realistic option, the mechanics of transatlantic 
dialogue and consultation have gradually been agreed upon, with the Transatlantic 
Declaration of 1990 and the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 codifying the main 
institutional arrangements and principle fields of cooperation and common action. 
In addition to that, cooperation did not just cover bilateral matters, but was 
extended to the many international fora, from the WTO, the UN family of 
organizations to the G-8, and ultimately NATO, in line with the EU's evolving 
international role and capabilities.  
 
The unprecedented coincidence in transatlantic change-overs in the autumn of 
2004,  with the Barroso Commission starting on 1 November, the re-election of 
President Bush for a second term on 2 November, and a newly elected European 
Parliament and US Congress, provided a unique opportunity to reenergize the 
transatlantic agenda on the basis of a return to some degree of normality. Already 
during the three summits of June 20043, the working atmosphere had been 
characterized by a noticeable change of tone. From its very start, the second Bush 
Administration signaled an end to its tactics of polarization, in particular with regard 
to the European Union, as the traditional 'indispensable partner' of the 'indispensable 
nation'4. US military overstretch, soaring financial cost and budgetary deficits, moral 
discreditation and a crisis of legitimacy of US international action relying on the use 
of military power with no solution to the new threats in sight became the driving 
forces in favor of the search for New Realism. 
 
President Bush's visit to the European institutions in Brussels in February 2005, President 
Barroso's early invitation to the White House on 18 October 2005, and the EU-US June 
                                                 
2   An idea supported at regular intervals by the European Parliament, and more recently 
developed in the reports by Elmar Brok On improving EU-US relations in the framework of a 
Transatlantic Partnership Agreement of 8 May 2006 (A6-0173/2006), and by Erika Mann on 
EU-US Transatlantic Economic Relations of 20 April 2006 (A6-0131/2006). 
3   The G8 Summit under US Chairmanship in Sea Island, Georgia; the annual bilateral EU-US 
Summit in Dromoland Castle, Ireland, under Irish EU Council Presidency; and the NATO 
Summit in Istanbul, Turkey. 
4   America, the 'indispensable nation' is a term coined by President Clinton and generally 
attributed – and often used – by Secretary of State Albright. Portraying the EU as the 
‘indispensable partner’ is an intellectual liberty of my own making, much to the 
satisfaction of Madeleine Albright with whom I was proud to enjoy many stimulating 
conversations and a personal friendship throughout my term in Washington, DC. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2006 
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2005 Washington and June 2006 Vienna Summits, have put the broad EU-US agenda 
with its strategy, foreign policy, economic cooperation and global issues chapters 
back on track. On the institutional side, however, it appears questionable at present 
whether public doubts in the acceptance of US leadership and recent set-backs in 
further European integration with the ratification of the EU's Constitutional Treaty on 
hold, will allow major advances in updating the ten years old New Transatlantic 
Agenda into a new partnership agreement or transatlantic 'declaration of 
interdependence'. Looking further ahead, a new opportunity might be provided by 
the next transatlantic change-overs in 2009. A new US Administration, together with 
the renewal of EU institutions, important ongoing changes in member states' political 
leaderships and, hopefully, the implementation of major reinforcements in the EU's 
foreign policy machinery could create the much-needed momentum leading to a 
thorough update of transatlantic mechanisms and agendas. 
 
From the Early Beginnings to the End of the Cold War (1947 to 1989) 
From its inception, the process of European integration had a transatlantic 
dimension. Europe's 'founding fathers' revolutionary post-WW II project aiming at 
replacing a failed system of absolute national sovereignty by a community of nation 
states pooling sovereignty through common rules and institutions had the full support 
of the United States, in the spirit of the 'founding fathers' of the American Constitution 
of 1787. 
 
In contrast to the end of WW I, the US assumed the role of an active, protecting 
power and a mediator in Europe, and for that purpose remained present as 'a power 
in Europe' without being a European power. Reconstruction and stabilization of 
Western Europe became an indispensable building block of the US doctrine of 
containment and dissuasion of the communist threat. From the 
Truman/Eisenhower/Monnet via the Kennedy/Hallstein, the Reagan/Bush/Delors 
interaction up to the Clinton era, the US had been instrumental in supporting the 
evolving concept of an organized and structured transatlantic relationship based on 
a military alliance, NATO – with the US as the dominant member –, and on an 
evolving European Community-US partnership with the emerging 'New Europe'. 
 
The Marshall-Plan (1947) helped the devastated European economies to recover. 
Schuman and Monnet closely cooperated with the Truman and Eisenhower Günter Burghardt 
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Administrations based on their common World War II experience. George Ball, an 
American lawyer and later Undersecretary of State under Kennedy had an office at 
the 'Commissariat au Plan' advising Monnet on the European Coal and Steel 
Community Treaty.5 The US in the last year of the Truman Administration was the first 
third country to provide the ECSC with formal international recognition when Monnet 
received a dispatch from President Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson6 on his 
first day in office as President of the ECSC's High Authority.7 President Eisenhower 
followed up in 1953 with the accreditation of a US Ambassador, the first full 
diplomatic representative ever to a European institution.8 Monnet reciprocated by 
opening an ECSC information office in Washington DC in 19549, partly to offset US 
disappointment over the failure of the European Defence Community in the French 
Assembly which had strong US support. The regular visits of the first President of the 
                                                 
5   Georges Ball describes his close relationship with Jean Monnet and his active involvement 
“as a private American lawyer” with the Schuman Plan negotiations in a detailed chapter 
of his memoirs: The Past Has Another Pattern, Norton, New York, 1982, Part Three, pp. 69 to 
99. 
6   Dean Acheson’s memoirs: Present At The Creation, Norton, New York, 1969, is another 
invaluable source of information about the US role as a deeply dedicated ‘midwife’ 
during the early stages of European unification. 
7    This was the first formal diplomatic note addressed by a foreign government to a 
European Community institution. The written statement to the effect that the United States 
henceforth intended to deal with the ECSC High Authority on all matters of its 
competence constituted the first act of international recognition by a third country. 
8    David Bruce, the first US Ambassador accredited to the European Coal and Steel 
Community, was a top professional diplomat with a uniquely distinguished career, having 
been Ambassador to Paris, London and Bonn. His almost daily reports to the State 
Department and to the White House about the implementation of the ECSC Treaty and 
the ongoing negotiations on a European Defence Community form a remarkable part of 
any archive about Europe’s early days. During my term a full documentation was 
assembled at the European Commission Washington Delegation offices, drawing from the 
State Department and Library of Congress archives as well as from documents collected 
by the Universities of Georgetown (where Hallstein had delivered a series of lectures 
explaining the European process), Princeton and Yale.  
9   This office started operating initially from within the premises of George Ball’s law firm and 
was directed by a locally hired American journalist. Monnet thought that explaining the 
complex process of European integration to American decision makers was best done by 
an American. Over the decades the office evolved into a fully fledged “Delegation’, as 
the Commission preferred to call what is today a de facto  European Union Embassy. 
Since the early 1990s, the Head of Delegation has the status of Ambassador accredited 
to the US President. In May 2004, on the occasion of the Schuman Day and of the EU’s 
historical eastern enlargement, the fiftieth anniversary of European presence in 
Washington was celebrated in the Benjamin Franklin rooms of the US Department of State 
with speeches by Secretary Colin Powell and myself to mark the event (see 
www.eurunion.org/delegati/040506gb.htm). For the first time ever the European Union 
anthem was played in those official reception rooms, and a US Secretary of State paid 
tribute to the blue flag with the twelve golden stars at his headquarters. We ended the 
ceremony wishing that Benjamin Franklin’s 300th birthday in 2006 might coincide with the 
entry into force of the first EU Constitutional Treaty, accompanied by a solemn 
declaration on the transatlantic relationship. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2006 
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European Commission Walter Hallstein to Washington, and his conversations with 
President Kennedy inspired the latter to deliver a visionary speech on Independence 
Day, 4 July 1962, in Philadelphia with the twin proposal of a 'transatlantic partnership 
of equals' and a 'Declaration of Interdependence' between the 'New World' and the 
'New Europe' should the European agenda successfully materialize. And it was 
President Kennedy who advocated strongly with Prime Minister MacMillan the need 
for the UK to join the European Communities, including the unavoidable acceptance 
of the EC's not so popular Common Agricultural Policy – a rare example of farsighted 
leadership.10 
 
The web of consultations and agreements of all sorts got richer with the European 
Communities implementing the Paris and Rome Treaties. Consultations with the US 
Administrations were conducted by the Commission and culminated in yearly 'High 
Level' meetings between teams led by the US Secretary of State and the Commission 
President. Delors reinforced the momentum by turning the tide from the Euro-
pessimism of the late 1970s and early 1980s to the Single European Act of 1985 and 
the 1992 project of completing the Internal Market while regularly keeping in touch 
with Presidents Reagan and Vice President and later President Bush ('41').11 Delors' 
early visit to President Reagan at the White House in April 1985 greatly facilitated US 
understanding for the Commission President's 'Agenda 1992' – although it could not 
entirely dissipate initial American fears of a 'Fortress Europe' – and was instrumental 
for getting the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations off the ground, the 
prelude to the setting up of the WTO in 1995. 
 
The April 1985 Reagan/Delors meeting in the White House was the opening set for 
regular and close consultations throughout the decade of three subsequent Delors 
Commission Presidencies. They provided the ground for the European side to fully 
assume its role, in close interaction with the Bush/Baker team, when the fall of the 
Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union opened the prospect of a 'Europe whole 
and free', a notion coined by President Bush in 1989. I would like to point to two not 
so widely publicized events that illustrate the central role played by the Commission 
President at a turning point of European history. The high regard Delors had acquired 
                                                 
10   See George Ball, op. cit., pp. 213-222. 
11   The acronyms "Bush '41'" and later "Bush '43'" (respectively the 41st and 43rd US President 
under the 1787 Constitution) are widely used as a distinction between Bush 'father' and 
Bush 'son'. Günter Burghardt 
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and the confidence placed in his unpretentious intellectual leadership led President 
Bush to stop over in Brussels on 4 December 1989, on his way back to Washington 
from his Summit meeting with President Gorbatchev in Malta, not only to inform 
NATO partners but also to brief Delors and to seek his support for what would later be 
known as the four basic principles of the 'Europe whole and free' agenda. I 
remember the – unusual – White House press communiqué after the meeting, 
pointing to the fact that this was the third meeting between Presidents Bush and 
Delors during that year and expressing President Bush's appreciation for Delors’ 
personal contribution and insight.  
 
The political concept Bush had put together appeared simple and ingenious: equal 
respect for the two fundamental and yet not always easily reconcilable Helsinki 
principles relating to the recognition of existing borders and the right for self 
determination, the perspective of German unification in the context of European 
integration and the North Atlantic Alliance, and a massive and coordinated effort of 
economic and financial support for the new democracies in central and eastern 
Europe. Bush sought Delors’ support for an agenda to which not all European leaders 
had yet whole-heartedly accepted, as the subsequent December 1989 Strasbourg 
European Council meeting with Mitterrand had famously shown. Already in July 1989, 
at the G-7 'Sommet de l'Arche' in Paris, Bush had joined forces with Chancellor Kohl 
and the Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney to convince a reluctant Mitterrand (in the 
chair as the G-7 host) and a more than sceptical UK Prime Minister Thatcher that 
Delors should be tasked with the coordination of what would become the G-24 
financial assistance effort for Europe's liberated new democracies.  
 
In a way, the subsequent EU pre-accession and then accession process leading to 
the EU's eastern enlargement on 1 May 2004, had its early roots at that memorable 
G-7 dinner on 14 July 1989, at the 'Hotel de la Marine' overlooking the Place de la 
Concorde surrounded by the festivities of the bicentenary of the French Revolution, 
so ably orchestrated by Mitterrand's Sherpa Jacques Attali. What was most 
remarkable was the deep familiarity, knowledge and appreciation by the US 
leadership of the role assumed by the nascent European institutions, and more EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2006 
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particularly by the European Commission in those creative moments of Europe's 
history.12 
 
From 'Eleven/Nine' 1989 to 'Nine/Eleven' 2001 
The fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 symbolized the greatest common 
achievement of the US and Europe. It resulted from the successful combination of US 
determination, based on its military power, and from the attractiveness of the model 
of European integration to the peoples under communist rule. The post 11/9/1989 
agenda, "Europe whole and free and at peace with itself" would not have been 
possible with the US or Europe acting alone. The end of the Cold War led to 
significant transformations of the geopolitical environment. A complex, much more 
unpredictable multipolar security landscape, had replaced the bipolar structure of 
confrontation between two rival power blocs. Transatlantic relations saw themselves 
confronted with new security threats: international terrorism, proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, failed states, regional conflicts, the first Gulf war and the Balkan 
wars.  
 
Both those changes in the geopolitical environment and Europe's expanding 
capabilities as a global political and strategic actor led to a positive reassessment of 
EU-US relations at the end of the Cold War. European integration had created the 
indispensable context that led the 'Four plus Two' negotiations to a successful 
conclusion. As described above, the Bush ('41') Administration very early in the 
process recognized these fundamental facts. Benefiting from President Bush and 
Secretary Baker's close personal relations with Commission President Delors, both 
teams engaged in what have probably been among the most productive moments 
of the European-American relationship. 
 
As a result, the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration (TAD), ultimately agreed at the margins 
of the November CSCE Summit at the Paris Kleber Conference Center13, for the first 
                                                 
12   A much later testimony of the then US leaders’ state of mind concerning the process of 
European unification has been recorded by Wilfried Martens, a former Belgian Prime 
Minister, in his recently published autobiography (De Memoires, Tielt, 2006, pp. 602-603): 
During a private event in a Flemish provincial town in July 1999, attended by Reagan, 
Bush, Thatcher and Martens, the discussion was about whom they considered the 
greatest political personality in Europe after the war. While Thatcher naturally concluded 
on Winston Churchill the three other discussants agreed on Jean Monnet. Günter Burghardt 
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time defined the principles for EU-US cooperation and consultation in a single and 
comprehensive formal document. The two sides agreed to inject fresh momentum 
into cooperation on transatlantic and global trade and economic relations – with 
the US side putting an end to the 'Fortress Europe' criticism in relation to the EU's '1992' 
project of completing its Internal Market. The TAD agenda also covered the EU's 
nascent foreign policy cooperation, which had been institutionalized for the first time 
in the Single European Act, signed on 28 February 1986 and entered into effect on 1 
July 1987, covering issues such as the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, while military matters were excluded at the explicit 
request of the US negotiators.14 On procedure the TAD established a mechanism for 
consultations at all levels, including biannual summits, ministerial and working level 
meetings, as well as regular briefings with the European Political Cooperation 
structures. On the European side the TAD committed the Commission as well as the 
Member States through the respective Council Presidencies. The earlier format of 
'High Level Consultations' were discontinued and replaced, at the initiative of the 
Commission, by regular 'sub-cabinet meetings' to cover the various working level 
contacts on the many issues of community competence. 
 
In 1995 the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) together with a Joint Action Plan 
completed and reinforced the 1990 agenda and mechanisms in response to EU 
developments under the Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7 February 1992 and entered 
into effect on 1 November 1993, the gradual implementation of the Union's Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, the enlargement and pre-accession processes and the 
EU's gearing up to its 'Agenda 2000' agreed at the December 1995 Madrid European 
Council. Again, progress in transatlantic relations went hand in hand with the 
                                                 
13   Interestingly enough the EU/US bilateral Declaration saw the light at a moment when the 
transformation from the CSCE to the OSCE, another ‘transatlantic’ multilateral 
organization, coincided with the signing of the OSCE ‘Charter for a New Europe’ (not the 
polemic neoconservative caricature à la Rumsfeld, but a memorable European-
American historic achievement).  
14    While the US had actively supported the European Defence Community Treaty in the 
early 1950s, their attitude had changed with the subsequent  incorporation of Germany 
into NATO and WEU. Henceforth US negotiators traditionally maintained that military 
security matters were issues to be discussed with Allies in NATO. A particularly robust and 
somewhat undiplomatic expression of this stance was the Dobbins-Bartholomew 
memorandum in the spring of 1991 addressed to EU Member States members of NATO 
during the Intergovernmental Conference leading to the conclusion of the Maastricht 
European Union Treaty in December 1991. That demarche resulted in strengthening the 
hand of those member states that took minimalist positions towards the common security 
and defence articles of the Treaty, in particular its Art. J 4, the complex architecture of 
which can be partly attributed to the pressure exercised by the US. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2006 
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dynamics of European integration and intergovernmental cooperation. The NTA's 
objective was to move from consultation under the TAD to a new level of 
cooperation and common action, including all aspects of security and defence 
policies this time. 
 
Until today, the NTA represents the most comprehensive 'constitutional basis' of EU-US 
cooperation. It provides an institutionalized framework for official EU-US interactions: 
regular meetings at the Presidential, Ministerial and working levels. The NTA's four 
main goals are promoting peace, stability, democracy, and development; 
expanding world trade and economic growth; meeting global challenges (including 
cooperation fields such as environment protection, protection of public health, and 
law enforcement issues); and building ties between EU and US representatives from 
business, academic, consumer, labour, environment, and government circles 
[including the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD) and the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue (TABD)]. The Joint EU-US Action Plan comprised some 150 specific actions to 
which the EU and the US have committed themselves (these range from reducing 
barriers to transatlantic trade and investment to promoting links between colleges 
and universities). 
 
In the context of the NTA, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) was launched 
at the EU-US London Summit in 1998 to reduce many of the remaining barriers to the 
free flow of commerce and to facilitate conducting business across the Atlantic. The 
TEP is an extension of the approach taken in the NTA, including both bilateral and 
multilateral elements. Bilaterally it aims at tackling technical barriers to trade through 
the expansion of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) and other measures. 
Multilaterally its purpose is to further stimulate liberalization – by joining forces on 
international trade issues. The TEP also provides for an 'early warning system' to share 
information on regulatory initiatives with a view to contain disputes, particularly in the 
area of food safety. 
 
The Bonn Declaration adopted at the 1999 EU-US Summit in Bonn presented another 
step forward from the NTA. Both sides explicitly committed themselves to a "full and 
equal partnership" in economic, political and security affairs. Embedded in the NTA 
process, the Bonn Declaration outlined how the EU and the US wanted to shape their 
relationship over the decade ahead. These arrangements were more recently Günter Burghardt 
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stepped up by further economic initiatives launched in consecutive Summit 
meetings from 2001 until today: the Positive Economic Agenda (PEA) launched in 
2002, the Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency and the Financial 
Markets Regulatory Dialogue. They clearly illustrate the comprehensiveness of the EU-
US economic relationship which goes far beyond occasional although highly 
publicized trade disputes and is supported by close to fifty individual sector or issue-
specific agreements and administrative arrangements, institutionalized dialogues 
and regulatory cooperation activities at all levels between the US Administration and 
the European Commission. 
 
A particularly successful area of cooperation has developed over the years in the 
area of competition policy. Contrary to public perception following a few 
controversial and highly publicized cases, close links have been established between 
the European Commissioner in charge of antitrust matters and his two US 
counterparts, the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 
In 2001 the 10th anniversary of the EU-US 1991 Cooperation Agreement was 
celebrated at the EU Commission's Kalorama Residence with Commissioner Mario 
Monti and successive teams of Attorneys General and Chairmen of the FTC in 
attendance. When GE/Honeywell and Microsoft were hotly discussed in public, 
Mario Monti also found a way to discuss matters quietly on the Hill with members of 
Congress led by Senators DeWine and Kohl. 
 
All in all, the EU-US economic relationship holds important lessons for both the 
European Union's policy aspirations and a well functioning transatlantic partnership. 
European and American economies have become more intertwined and 
interdependent after the end of the Cold War. The years since the Cold War – when 
the 'glue' of the Cold War partnership supposedly loosened transatlantic relations – 
marked actually one of the most intense periods of transatlantic integration ever. The 
economic relationship became a stabilizer of the overall relationship. Particularly in 
the areas of trade and competition policies, and regulatory cooperation, EU-US 
interaction reached an unprecedented level of intensity that has earned the EU 
collective respect as an equal partner by Administration, Congress and the business 
community. In a nutshell, it is widely recognized that the transatlantic economy 
constitutes the most globalized part of the global economy. 
 EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2006 
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A profound change of direction in the overall transatlantic relationship marked the 
start of President G.W. Bush's first term in early 2001. While the EU-US partnership had 
generally grown ever closer until the end of the Clinton era, President Bush '43' 
started off by disavowing an important number of international commitments, 
including the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court Treaty. At the same 
time, the EU and the US had decided, not entirely convincingly, to reduce the 
number of summit meetings from two to one per year. When the first, now  annual 
EU-US Summit took place in June 2001, in Göteborg, Sweden, the US President faced 
harsh criticism from the 16 members of the European Council.15 These developments 
led to growing tensions with the EU during the first eight months preceding 11 
September 2001, when the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington with their 
tectonic geopolitical effects marked a crucial crossroads not only for the bilateral 
EU-US relationship.16 
 
From Post-September-Eleven to Today's New Realism  
The unprecedented terrorist attacks on the United States' mainland on September 
11, 2001 profoundly and abruptly changed America's traditional sense of 
invulnerability and security at home.17 The collapse of the twin towers represented a 
widely underestimated turning point in America's foreign and security policy – 
America was, and still considers itself to be, 'at war'.  
 
When the Presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission, 
Verhofstadt and Prodi, visited President Bush in the Oval Office on 27 September 
2001, they expressed Europe's unreserved solidarity with the US and proposed to start 
                                                 
15   This was the first ever meeting at Summit level, where the US President met all 16 members 
of the European Council (the 15 Heads of State or Governments and Commission 
President Prodi) collectively. The Summit also had another historic significance since it 
coincided with the first bilateral visit of a US President to Sweden. 
16   Condoleezza Rice, the then National Security Advisor, would stress at later lunches with 
the EU Heads of Mission in Washington, DC, how much the President had disliked the 
‘Gothenburg bashing’. The atmospherics had been badly affected to a degree that 
might explain Ms Rice’s harsh language when she informed the Heads of Mission at the 
first post-Göteborg joint lunch at Ambassador Eliasson’s Residence during Sweden’s 
Council Presidency that "Kyoto was dead upon arrival". 
17    I was able first hand to witness the dramatic impact of these earthshaking events in 
Washington. While briefing the members of the European Parliament’s Delegation for 
Relations with the US Congress in the press room of the Commission Delegation in the 
early morning of 11 September news came in about a plane having hit the North Tower. 
Switching on our TV screen we followed the day’s incredible events. Our first meeting with 
Congressional counterparts in an almost deserted Capitol Hill was a deeply moving 
experience. In this hour of tragedy ‘we were all Americans’.  Günter Burghardt 
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working on a common agenda. President Bush readily replied that the dramatic 
nature of this challenge to the entire civilized world "provides us with a new 
opportunity to work together". Sadly, that opportunity was not fully grasped. While 
transatlantic cooperation in the areas of justice and home affairs successfully 
extended into a wide range of subjects covered on the Washington end by the 
Department of Justice and by the newly created Homeland Security Department, 
the US-led 'war on terror' quickly divided the international community and drove a 
wedge right through the European Union. After a period of international unity 
focused on Afghanistan, the US resumed a policy of unilaterally determining the 
agenda, preferring ad-hoc "coalitions of the willing" to partnerships of equals and 
"tool boxes" to permanent Alliances.18 
 
In retrospect, 9/11 had the effect of amplifying a policy mix based on a number of 
factors which presidential speech writers are nowadays eager to coin the 'Bush 
doctrine': the ideology of the neoconservative foreign policy school; the reliance on 
the military superiority of the world's sole hyper power with a defense budget bigger 
than all other countries' defense budgets combined; the religiously motivated 
missionary zeal of America as the chosen country called by history and divine 
providence to defend freedom and democracy, God's gift to mankind; the 
unconditional support for the policies of Israeli governments allied with the large 
'reborn Christian' constituencies in the American 'bible belt'; an oversimplified and 
devastatingly polarizing distinction between right and wrong, good and evil; and a 
refusal to let 'others' have a say in determining America's course of action. Hand in 
hand with a naïve and badly informed comparison between bringing regime 
change and democracy to Iraq and the wider Middle East and the successful and 
peaceful post-WW II transformations in Germany and Japan, and inspired by a quick 
and easy 'mission accomplished' mentality, it has become increasingly evident that 
the foreign policy experiments of the Bush Administration will probably have to be 
                                                 
18   There was a similar effect on the EU’s internal developments: cooperation in Justice and 
Home Affairs, a long time neglected ‘third pillar’, picked up momentum and benefited a 
broad transatlantic anti-terrorism agenda while the EU’s foreign policy chief Javier Solana 
was quickly made to understand that, in the absence of EU common positions, he was to 
p r a c t i s e  t h e  a r t  o f  m a k i n g  h i m s e l f  i n v i s i b l e .  L a t e r  o n ,  i n  a n  a r t i c l e  o f  t h e  International 
Herald Tribune, dated 12 August 2006, he is quoted as follows: "It would have been absurd 
to think that I could resolve the situation publicly. Sometimes you have to know (…) that 
means disappearing at the right time." The exemplary cooperation between 
Commissioner Vittorino and the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator G. de Vries, on the one 
hand, and Homeland Security Secretary Rich as well as Attorney General Ashcroft, on the 
other, became a noteworthy success story in transatlantic cooperation. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2006 
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remembered as counting among the most problematic periods of contemporary 
American history. The mounting number of self-critical publications and the growing 
intensity of the domestic debate, however, are a hopeful and healthy sign of 
America's inherent power to ultimately adjust an unhappy course of action. The 
more recent experience of the July 2006 Lebanon war has sent an additional 
formidable message to all sides that military power alone is insufficient to solve 
problems in the absence of a broader therapy addressing the root causes.  
 
The EU, for reasons of own shortcomings, proved unable to respond collectively as a 
Union. Its members split into those who decided to follow and those who opposed 
the US, advocating a more comprehensive and internationally legitimized approach 
of what Europe prefers to call 'fight against terrorism' as opposed to 'war on terror'. 
This did not, however, prevent the EU and the US from signing important agreements 
on a number of homeland security and counter-terrorism measures and to continue 
working together on Afghanistan and other international hot spots, crucial 
achievements that have continued without interruption – despite the most serious 
worsening of the transatlantic political climate over the war against Iraq. 
 
While, as a consequence, for much of 2002 and 2003, the general tenor of EU-US 
relations remained uneasy and combative, 2004 saw some of the rifts beginning to 
settle. In the US, after a period of patriotic conformism and almost zero tolerance 
with respect to criticizing a President at war, critical voices took issue with the course 
of US foreign policy and its increasingly negative effects on America's public image. 
Increasingly the case was made for America to reach out to its partners, notably the 
EU. The neoconservative agenda of preemption and preeminence, of "the mission 
determining the coalition" had obviously met with limits of military, financial and 
moral overstretch. Foreign policy uncharacteristically dominated the presidential 
campaign of 2004 in a country deeply divided. 
 
On the EU side, lessons had been learned as well. It had become clear that no single 
member state on its own was able to ultimately influence the Washington decision-
making process, and that only collective engagement together with enhanced 
capabilities could make an impact. Moreover, putting aside past differences over 
the war had to make room for the need to address together post-Saddam Iraq as 
part of the problems of the wider Middle East, a region closer to Europe than to the Günter Burghardt 
  18
US. The triple G-8, EU-US, and NATO Summit meetings in June 200419 displayed a new 
sense of realism, articulated in a quite substantive set of seven policy declarations at 
the EU-US meeting. 
 
The unique coincidence in transatlantic change-overs in November 2004, a newly 
elected European Parliament in June 2004, the Barroso Commission starting its 
mandate on 1 November 2004, coinciding with President Bush's re-election for a 
second term, together with Congressional elections, on 2 November 2 2004, 
provided an opportunity on both sides to reassess the state of the transatlantic 
relationship and to re-energize the transatlantic agenda in the areas of the 
economy, foreign and security policies and the strengthening of the consultative 
mechanisms.  
 
A first strong gesture was the visit by President Bush to EU Headquarters in Brussels on 
22 February 2005. The Summit meeting with the 25 EU Heads of State or Government 
as well as Commission President Barroso reviewed the main priorities on the 
international agenda, including the Middle East, Iraq, Iran, the Barcelona Process, 
the Balkans and Russia, and global economic and environmental issues. On this 
occasion, the EU and the US reaffirmed their commitment to transatlantic 
partnership, "irreplaceable and vital" to meeting common challenges. Four months 
later, the June 2005 Summit in Washington, DC, adopted joint declarations on the 
promotion of democracy, the Middle East, UN reform, counter-terrorism and non-
proliferation and Africa. Central part of the Summit's agenda was the strengthening 
of economic cooperation. The Summit launched an "EU-US Initiative to Enhance 
Transatlantic Economic Integration and Growth" and agreed to boost trade and 
investment between the EU and the US by, inter alia, setting up a "High Level 
Regulatory Co-operation Forum" to facilitate regulatory cooperation. A "Roadmap 
for Regulatory Cooperation" set the priorities for a number of sectors and specific 
issues, thus tying the efforts to complete a transatlantic business friendly regulatory 
environment in with and reinforcing the EU's own Lisbon agenda. On 18 October 
2005, Commission President Barroso's invitation to the White House – the first such 
bilateral visit of a Commission President to the White House for many years – added 
to the list of conciliatory gestures. Discussions focused on the WTO Doha Round, 
transatlantic economic issues and the promotion of democracy around the world.  
                                                 
19   See footnote 3. EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2006 
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All in all, 2005 had seen a determined and systematic effort to change the rhetoric 
and to discontinue a policy of polarization, a necessary condition for putting a 
transatlantic agenda back on track. Clearly, the biggest progress so far has been 
made with respect to economic cooperation. On 30 November 2005, following   
commitments made at the EU-US Summit, the EU side hosted a first informal EU-US 
Economic Ministerial meeting bringing together relevant members of the 
Commission, member states Ministers representing three successive Council 
Presidencies and a US team led by the Secretary of Commerce. Issues discussed 
included Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), regulatory cooperation, trade and 
security, and innovation. 
 
At the June 2006 Vienna EU-US Summit the atmosphere was forward-looking 
(President Bush: "What is past is past and what's ahead of us is a hopeful democracy 
in the Middle East"). The four broad agenda items, foreign policy cooperation with a 
particular focus on the Middle East, confronting global challenges, energy security 
and economic and trade issues were dealt with constructively. Where differences 
remained, "we disagreed in an agreeable way"20. The Summit mandated another 
Economic Ministerial meeting to implement the broadened "Roadmap for EU-US 
Regulatory Cooperation" annexed to the Vienna Declaration. The second US-EU 
Economic Ministerial took place in Washington, DC, on 9 November 2006 and was 
co-chaired by the US Secretary of Commerce Gutierrez and the US Secretary of 
Energy Bodman with the Commission Vice-President Verheugen and the Finnish 
Minister for Trade attending for the EU side. The agenda routinely covered a number 
of regulatory issues, with a specific focus on renewable and alternative energy 
matters. There clearly is a need for creating additional momentum  in order to allow 
the next EU-US Summit meeting in spring 2007 under Germany's EU Presidency to take 
another step forward and to further broaden the economic agenda. 
 
With regard to foreign and security policy, much depends on the EU's ability to 
pursue its course towards more effective diplomatic and security structures and 
assets. Only with the further reinforcement of its 'hard' power capacities will the EU's 
impressive 'soft' power resources gain the full credit they deserve. Of course, it is also 
up to America to review the principles underpinning its foreign and security policy. 
                                                 
20   President Bush at the post Summit Press Conference. Günter Burghardt 
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However, that is frankly a debate that the EU can only hope to influence by getting 
its own act together. More fundamentally, the EU-US partnership will require a better 
meeting of the minds on strategy. Post 9/11 the dominant agendas are different, as 
illustrated by the gap between the September 2002 US National Security Strategy 
based on the doctrine of preemption and preeminence21, and the December 2003 
EU Security Strategy based on effective multilateralism. The EU's 'post-1989' agenda 
focuses on peace by nation-building with internationally legitimated use of force as 
a measure of last resort. This agenda rests on the bitter experience of centuries of 
wars that have brought Europe close to destruction. The US 2001 'war on terror' 
agenda is about regaining invulnerability at home by exercising on a global basis 
what America considers its sovereign rights. Simply speaking, the peoples of Europe, 
knowing by experience that there is no absolute protection against terrorist acts, feel 
themselves largely at peace, reconciled, seeking to export stability across their 
borders, while America feels itself at war. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Today, the US margin of maneuver is limited as a consequence of military 
overstretch, financial deficits, the loss of the moral high ground and the deep 
damage done to the US Administration's image in the world. An intensely self-critical 
internal debate in the US again is about the need for stable partnerships, with the EU 
first in line. The library of recent foreign policy literature22 argues that the 
                                                 
21   The US National Security Strategy has been updated in March 2006, expanding on and 
assessing the 2002 version. "America is at war" remains the major focus while the threat 
analysis is zooming in on the problem of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and identifying Iran as 
the country likely to present the single greatest future challenge. Most commentators 
have severely criticized the document as more of the same with William Pfaff stating that 
"intellectual poverty is the most striking quality of the new statement" revealing "a lumpy 
stew of discredited neoconservative ideas" (see International Herald Tribune, 20 March 
2006). 
22   Among early assessments about the growing transatlantic crisis as a result of 
neoconservative unilateralism are: Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power – why 
the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone, 2002; Charles Kupchan, The End of the 
American Era, 2002; and Clyde Prestowitz, Rogue Nation – American Unilateralism and the 
Failure of Good Intentions, 2003. A comprehensive "examination of what has gone wrong 
in the fragile US/Europe Alliance – and how to make it right" is Allies at War – America, 
Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq by Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, 2004. Other key 
contributions include: Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice – Global Domination or Global 
Leadership, 2004; Henry Kissinger/Larry Summers, Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership, 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2004; Georges Soros, The Bubble of Supremacy, 2004; Simon 
Serfaty, The Vital Partnership – Power and Order, America and Europe Beyond Iraq, 2005; 
an Atlantic Council policy paper: The Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO/EU EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2006 
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neoconservative 'Bush Doctrine' lies in shambles and that the US image in the rest of 
the world has shifted from the Statue of Liberty and the "Shining city on the hill"23 to 
the hooded prisoner at Abu Ghraib. Headlines such as Anatol Lieven's "Decadent 
America must give up imperial ambitions"24 dramatically illustrate the depths of new 
American soul searching. The outcome of the June 2006 war between Israel and 
Lebanon reinforces the lesson that the use of military power alone – without at the 
same time dealing with the root causes of Middle East problems – far from solving 
those underlying issues, only increases anger and frustration and provides a breeding 
ground for more conflict instead of leading to a much needed reconciliation. 
 
The increasingly disastrous situation in Iraq together with unprecedentedly low 
approval for the Bush Administration have translated into the dramatic power shift as 
a result of the 7 November 2006 mid-term elections. The Democrats' gaining the 
majority in both the House and the Senate as well as among newly elected State 
Governors, is putting President Bush under severe pressure to diversify his sources of 
advice. The spectacular departure of Secretary Rumsfeld, an icon of the Iraq 
strategy, and the central role of the Iraq Study Group led by former Secretary of 
State Baker illustrate the fact that without a change of course in US Middle East 
Policy over the two years the Republican stand in the 2008 elections would seem to 
become extremely critical.25 
 
                                                 
Security Agenda by Burwell, Gompert, Lebl, Lodal and Slocombe, February 2006. Francis 
Fukuyama’s America at the Crossroads – Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative 
Legacy, 2006, provides an in-depth analysis of the dominant foreign policy school at the 
heart of the Bush Administration. Another turn in the doctrinal debate is Ethical Realism – a 
Vision for America’s Role in the World, 2006, co-authored by the leftist Anatol Lieven and 
the conservative John Hulsman, looking back longingly to the kind of self-confident 
multilateral commitment of the Cold War Eisenhower and Truman Administrations as an 
inspiration for present day’s policy makers.  
23   John Winthrop’s famous saying in June 1629 upon arriving with the Pilgrim Fathers on the 
shores of what is now Massachusetts: “Consider that wee shall be as a citty [sic] upon a 
hill, the eies [sic] of all people upon us” can rightly be seen as the foundation of America’s 
soft power, the aspiration of freedom and liberty, the pursuit of happiness in the land of 
unlimited opportunities, a soft power so badly eroded over the past years. 
24   Financial Times, 29 November 2005. 
25   In almost perfect timing with the run-up to the mid-term elections Bob Woodward, the 
author of “Bush at War” in 2002, and “Plan of Attack” in 2004, had come out with his third 
national bestseller “State of Denial”, 2006. All three widely marketed publications describe 
in remarkable delail the neo-conservative foreign policy decision making process post 
from September 11 to today’s Iraq conundrum, and have no doubt played their part in 
shaping informed public opinion. After “Watergate” this is surely another important 
example of the maturity of the American democratic process. Günter Burghardt 
  22
Fighting terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
dealing with the world's many trouble spots, engaging in nation building where states 
have failed or have been destroyed, all this and more requires the combined and 
complementary blend of European mainly soft and American primarily hard power. 
Although transatlantic partnership will necessarily continue to show some degree of 
asymmetry, it must be based on mutual respect and the realistic assumption that 
agreement will not always be possible on all issues and that therefore any 
disagreements must be managed equally respectfully.  
 
There have been regular suggestions that such management should be based on a 
strengthened set of bilaterally agreed rules, of developing the present mechanisms, 
the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 and the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995, into 
some form of treaty. It appears questionable whether public doubts in the 
acceptance of US leadership and recent set-backs in further European integration 
with the ratification of the EU's Constitutional Treaty on hold will allow major 
advances soon in updating the ten year old New Transatlantic Agenda into a new 
partnership agreement and/or transatlantic 'Declaration of Interdependence'. 
Present circumstances may suggest that such a high profile proposition might not be 
achievable in the near future. However, it remains a necessary step to be 
undertaken when conditions become more favorable on both sides in the 
perspective of transatlantic change-overs by 2009. 
 
Geopolitical developments over the next decades, from accelerating economic 
globalization to the emergence of new political power centers make the case for 
transatlantic partnership between the ‘New World’ and the ‘New Europe’, as the 
backbone of the multipolar global system, ever more compelling. While the most 
recent transatlantic survey has shown again that confidence in the leadership of the 
present US Administration has continued its steep descent,26 the June 2006 
Bertelsmann/Emnid international survey about "World Powers in the 21st Century" 
concludes that despite its worsened negative image the US will remain in overall 
                                                 
26   Transatlantic Trends 2006, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and 
the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support provided by Fundação Luso-
Americana, Fundación BBVA, and the Tipping Point Foundation, Washington DC and 
Brussels, 6 September 2006, www.transatlantictrends.org/index.cfm?id=36 (20 November 
2006). EU Diplomacy Papers 2/2006 
  23
demand as a principle international force of order.27 The US, as much as the EU, will 
have to engage in serious home work for transatlantic partnership to remain the 
prominent mutually attractive policy option in the longer term. The US, the ‘more 
perfect Union’, will need to actively regain full credibility in relation to its conduct of 
international affairs. The EU will have to convincingly prove that its determination to 
evolve towards ‘an ever closer Union’ is unaffected by the recent set-backs over the 
failed ratification of its Constitutional Treaty. The fiftieth anniversary of the Rome 
Treaties in March 2007 will be the occasion for the adoption by EU leaders of a 
second 'Messina Declaration' on the future of Europe which might pave the way to 
rescue the essential institutional reforms agreed as part of the Treaty. New 
leaderships in Germany and France, two of the founding members, will wish to 
complete that task under their respective EU Presidencies in early 2007 and late 2008. 
If successful, the EU’s capacity to act as a major international player would be 
greatly enhanced. A EU foreign minister, working under the dual authority of a more 
continuous Council Presidency as well as of the Commission President would 
considerably streamline transatlantic communication and common action. The EU’s 
growing capabilities and collective experience in security and defense would open 
the opportunity for NATO to evolve towards a more appropriate European-American 
Treaty Organization. The objective of achieving a barrier-free transatlantic market by 
2015, as well as closer ties between legislators in a Transatlantic Assembly bringing 
together the European Parliament and the US Congress would all appear attractive 
building blocs for a Transatlantic Partnership Treaty to be initiated in 2009. The March 
2007 ‘Second Messina Declaration’ to be adopted by the European Council in 
special session in Berlin should express the EU’s openness to start discussions to that 
effect, in the spirit of John F. Kennedy’s visionary proposals almost 45 years ago.  
                                                 
27   Bertelsmann Stiftung/Emnid, "World Powers in the 21st Century", Berlin, 2 June 2006. Günter Burghardt 
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